Patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) is a technique of managing acute pain which utilizes a programmable syringe pump to allow the patient to selfadminister opiate analgesia. It is regarded as a very safe technique which gives high patient satisfaction and reduces staff workload. The safety record of PCA has been extremely good since it was first described by Keeri-Szanto in 1971 1 . Only a few cases of opioid overdose from PCA pumps have been described and here I report two cases of morphine overdose related to the use of PCA pumps.
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CASE 1
A 30-year-old male patient had a repair of perforated peptic ulcer as an emergency procedure. The intraoperative course was unremarkable and intravenous PCA morphine was prescribed for postoperative pain relief. The morphine solution (1 mg per ml) was prepared in the usual way. To a 50 ml Terumo eccentric syringe, 45 mg morphine was added to normal saline producing a total volume of 45 ml. The syringe was connected to a 75 cm extension tubing which had a volume of approximately 5 ml (Heidelberg tubing, B. Braun). After priming the tubing, the volume of solution left in the syringe was 40 ml. The syringe was then inserted into the PCA pump (Graseby 3300). The pump was programmed to give a bolus of 1 mg, lockout time of 10 minutes and a four-hour maximum of 15 mg. Two hours after his operation, he was found to be stable in terms of vital signs and the volume of drug left was approximately 40 ml. When checked again two hours later, his condition was also stable (pulse rate 87 bpm, BP 110/70, resp rate 20 bpm, pain-free and awake). However, the volume of morphine solution left in the syringe was noted to be only 30 ml. In order to make sure that was the correct volume, the nurse opened the cover of the PCA pump to have a closer look. At that stage she noticed that the syringe was being emptied slowly. In order to halt the process, she pressed the "off" button. That action did not stop the PCA pump so she pressed the "stop" button twice. That did not work either. She then disconnected the tubing attached to the syringe from the intravenous giving set with anti-reflux valve (B. Braun Melsungen AG, Germany). By the time the tubing was disconnected from the patient, 25 mg of morphine had been administered, i.e. only 5 ml of morphine remained in the syringe. The time taken was only five minutes.
Despite a dose of 25 mg of morphine within five minutes, there was no significant change in the patient's pulse rate, blood pressure or respiratory rate. He remained pain-free but drowsy. The PCA pump was removed and he was observed closely with no other specific treatment required. Continuous oxygen saturation showed his SpO 2 ranged from 92 to 98%. He remained pain-free till the fourth postoperative day when he requested two opioid injections (pethedine 75 mg IMI) four hours apart. He was discharged home on the sixth postoperative day.
The PCA pump was later returned to the manufacturer for inspection. The alarm of the PCA pump did not sound or flash to indicate a malfunction at any time. When the program was reviewed shortly afterwards, it only showed four demands and two good as it did at the time of the incident. At no stage were electronic devices such as diathermy, mobile telephone, portable notebook computer or calculators in use close to the patient. The PCA pump had been placed on top of the patient's locker, about 30 cm above his heart level.
CASE 2
Only three weeks after the first incident while the "faulty" PCA pump was being tested for malfunction, another morphine overdose from a PCA pump (Graseby 3300) occurred. The patient was a 72-yearold man who had drainage of psoas abscess under general anaesthesia. Again the intraoperative course was unremarkable. Intravenous PCA morphine was started in the recovery area. The morphine solution was prepared in a concentration of 1.0 mg/ml, the same way as for the first patient, and the PCA was programmed to give a bolus of 1 mg, lockout time 10 minutes and four-hour limit 12 mg. After a short stay in the recovery area, he was sent back to the general ward. On return to the ward the nursing staff put the PCA pump on top of the patient's locker which was about 30 cm above his heart level. A minute or so after patient's return, the nursing staff noticed the volume of the morphine was 30 ml. Fifteen minutes later while the nurse was taking the observations, the patient complained of pain. He was encouraged to make a demand on the PCA pump. The demand triggered forward movement of the plunger which came away from the plunger clamp and continued to move forward till the syringe emptied. Although the nurse did everything she could to stop the process, it happened so fast that the patient received morphine 30 mg within one minute. The total amount of morphine received within 25 minutes was 40 mg. Help was summoned. Anaesthetic staff arrived five minutes later to find the patient drowsy but rousable to verbal stimuli. Respiratory rate was 8 bpm. Blood pressure was stable. Naloxone 0.2 mg intravenously was given and patient woke up immediately and complained of pain. About 15 minutes later patient drifted back to sleep. As he was rousable with respiratory rate of around 10 bpm and stable vital signs, he was observed closely (pulse rate, BP, respiratory rate, pain score, sedation score every 15 minutes), and given supplementary oxygen. Oxygen saturation was monitored continuously till he recovered. Another dose of naloxone (0.2 mg IV) was given six hours after the incident when his respiratory rate fell to 8 bpm. Although his vital signs remained stable, he was drowsy for 20 hours. When asked specifically about the previous day's events, he had no recollection but was thankful to the staff for keeping him comfortable since his operation. He remained pain-free for another day and his subsequent wound pain was managed adequately with doloxene 50 mg orally every four hours if required. The PCA pump when inspected showed a total of six demands with three of them good. No record of the extra 37 mg of morphine given unintentionally was detected. The manufacturer of the PCA pump was asked to investigate the apparent malfunction. DISCUSSION PCA has been used worldwide for more than ten years and in Hong Kong all major hospitals have used PCA for over four years for postoperative pain management. The safety records of both the technique and the devices (Graseby 3300) have been excellent. There has been only one report of opioid overdose due to pump failure (personal communication). This pump failed because of damage from dropping it on the floor. The other reports of opioid overdose were either related to incorrect programming or drug dilution. The earlier models of the PCA pumps could be affected by electrical interference but that problem was rectified and all our models are not affected by it.
In other parts of the world, at least seven serious cases of opioid overdose have been reported [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The first fatal case due to equipment failure was reported by Grey and Sweeny in 1988 2 . In the same year Thomas and Owen reported another case of opioid overdose and the likely mechanism of the incident was syphoning as a result of a crack in the prefilled glass vial 3 . Syphoning is a well-known phenomenon and it may occur from any infusion syringe.
In 1992 another massive overdose of opioid intravenously was reported 4 . The cause of that particular incident was attributed to the disengagement of the glass syringe of a PCA pump from the drive mechanism. When the syringe plunger became disengaged from the drive mechanism, syphoning of the contents occurred. The weight and ease of movement of the plunger of a glass syringe make syphoning more likely to occur should other conditions favour it. Southern and Read reported a patient who had PCA (Graseby Medical, Watford, U.K.) started in the intensive care unit 5 . When she was subsequently transferred to the ward, she was found to be very drowsy. She had received intravenously 40 mg of morphine more than she demanded because of syphoning which occurred as the result of a suspected small leak around the rubber plunger of the syringe, allowing air to accumulate in the syringe.
We are aware that syphoning can cause accidental delivery of an overdose of solution. However, use of an anti-syphon valve does not eliminate the problem of overdose. Pump failure can occur as a result of electric corruption of the pump's program. Two such cases were reported in 1992 6 . The first incident could not be reproduced but it was speculated that the program had been corrupted by electrical interference during a bolus, causing the pump to fail to switch off the syringe driving motor. Subsequently, all their pumps were modified to protect against mains current fluctuations. The second incident was able to be reproduced by Graseby's engineers, who demonstrated a rare sequence of events involving static electricity which could corrupt the programming. Further software modifications were introduced to enhance safety. As the complexity of PCA pump design increases the number of potential faults that can occur increases 7 . Our first opioid overdose related to a PCA pump made us cautious. While we were investigating the possible causes (mismanagement, equipment fault, and external electrical interference), a second incident occurred, and although the patient recovered well, the overdose was more serious because the amount of drug was larger and the patient was much older. Working closely with the Graseby personnel, we eliminated incorrect programming of the pump as the cause because the program was correctly entered and no re-programming was undertaken. Electrical interference was thought to be unlikely because all our pumps were modified to avoid this problem. Syphoning of morphine solution from the syringe was felt to be the most likely cause because firstly the maximum speed of the PCA pump was 199.9 ml/hr with a 50 ml syringe, and in both of our cases the infusion rate exceeded 300 ml/hr. Secondly, the overinfused volume was not registered on the "totalizer". Thirdly, there were no alarms or any other special events registered on the "history". Fourthly, a dose limit of four-hour maximum was activated and the pump should have alarmed and stopped in the presence of overinfusion, but the PCA pumps did not alarm on both occasions. Syphoning could have occurred in both patients because the PCA pumps were placed approximately 30 cm above level of patients and no anti-syphon valve was used. Subsequently syphoning of the solution in the syringe was easily demonstrated by putting the syringe with solution, connection tubing, IV giving set with antireflux valve and Y connector in the PCA pump in the usual manner. The plunger of the syringe could be demonstrated to move away from the plunger clamp if the plunger was not properly clamped. Slight vibration of the PCA pump probably caused emptying of the syringe by syphoning in our first patient, as the actuator lock was found bent and later replaced by the manufacturer. Slight movement of the plunger clamp, as in our second case, by the patient's making a demand, could trigger the forward movement of the plunger as well. Apart from faulty placement of the plunger clamp, the plunger of a small size syringe could also break away from the clamp and easily result in unintentional delivery of the syringe content by syphoning. If the resistance of both the syringe and the connection tube is low, the speed of emptying due to syphoning can be high. Our second patient had 30 ml infused in less than one minute. In order to avoid this problem from recurring, apart from placing the PCA pump below the level of the patient and using the anti-syphon valve, we suggest the syringe used should have a big enough plunger to allow proper clamping of the plunger and the position of the plunger must be checked to ensure its accurate placement every time the syringe is changed.
In a district general hospital, two instances of naloxone treatment in 1000 patients on PCA pumps were recorded 8 . This confirms the good safety record of PCA. In addition to the above suggestions, safety is further enhanced by adhering to the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists' advisory guidelines for PCA 9 . Also, electronic devices should not be operated near the PCA pumps and all the pumps should be checked and maintained regularly. Although PCA pumps remain the primary responsibility of anaesthetists, nursing staff on the surgical wards should be educated to give them an understanding of the technique and confidence in it 4 .
